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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ROLANDO FUENTES,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43509
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2013-2590
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rolando Fuentes, pled guilty to one count of
grand theft by possession. He received a unified sentence of eight years, with three
years fixed. Although he was initially placed on probation, his probation was eventually
revoked, and the district court retained jurisdiction. After the district court relinquished
jurisdiction, Mr. Fuentes filed an I.C.R 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion which the district
court denied, finding Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion in the
plea agreement. On appeal, Mr. Fuentes contends that the district court erred in finding
that Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion pursuant to the terms of
the plea agreement.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On February 1, 2013, a person reported that their car had been broken into and
several items removed, including a purse containing credit cards.

(Presentence

Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.8.) Law enforcement reviewed surveillance
videos at two locations where the credit cards were used to purchase goods, and
identified the vehicle used by the suspects as belonging to Rolando Fuentes. (PSI,
pp.8-9.) Mr. Fuentes’ vehicle was stopped, he was detained and found in possession of
several of the items reported as stolen. (PSI, p.9.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Fuentes was charged by Information with one count of
burglary and one count of grand theft.1 (R., pp.18-19.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
binding on all parties and the district court pursuant to I.C.R. 11(f)(3), Mr. Fuentes pled
guilty to an amended information alleging grand theft by possession and the remaining
felony and misdemeanor charges were dismissed. (R., pp.38-49.) In exchange, the
State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence of eight years, with three years
fixed, and five years of probation. (R., pp.39-40.)
Mr. Fuentes was sentenced to eight years, with three years fixed, but the district
court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Fuentes on probation for five years and
five months.2 (R., pp.65-68.) Mr. Fuentes was ordered to serve 300 days in jail with

Mr. Fuentes was also cited for petit theft and having an invalid driver’s license, in
Canyon County case number 2013-2508 and with possession of drug paraphernalia
and possession of burglary tools in Canyon County case number 2013-2512.
(R., pp.22-23.)
2 At the time he was sentenced, Mr. Fuentes was finishing up a six month sentence for
misdemeanor DUI in Canyon County case number 2012-31087. (R., pp.55-56; PSI,
p.13.) The district court added an additional five months to the probationary period to
cover the remainder of the time he had to serve on the DUI sentence. (R., pp.66.)
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credit for 158 days already served, to be served concurrently with his sentence in
Canyon County case number 2012-31087. (R., p.67.)
A few months later, a motion for probation violation was filed against Mr. Fuentes
which alleged that Mr. Fuentes had changed his residence without his probation
officer’s permission and had not reported to his probation officer for over two weeks.
(R., pp.78-79.) After Mr. Fuentes admitted that he violated some of the terms and
condition of his probation, the district court revoked Mr. Fuentes’ probation, but retained
jurisdiction for 365 days.

(R., pp.88-89, 98-100.)

Thereafter, the district court

relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing. (R., pp.101-102.)
Mr. Fuentes then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to
reconsider its order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.103-104.) On June 2, 2015, the
district court held a hearing on Mr. Fuentes’ motion. (R., pp.108-110.) The next day,
the State filed a response to Mr. Fuentes’ motion in which it brought to the district
court’s attention for the first time that Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35
motion as a term of the plea agreement. (R., pp.111-117.) On July 17, 2015, the
district court denied Mr. Fuentes’s Rule 35 motion, finding Mr. Fuentes had waived his
right to file a Rule 35 motion pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. (R., pp.118123.)

On August 25, 2015, Mr. Fuentes timely appealed the district court’s order

denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.124-128.)
ISSUES
Did the district court err in finding Mr. Fuentes waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion
from the order relinquishing jurisdiction?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Fuentes Waived His Right To File A Rule 35
Motion From The Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction
Mr. Fuentes’ plea agreement contained, inter alia, the following terms:
Defendant understands that pursuant to Idaho law he has an absolute
right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court as well as the right
to move the Court to reconsider his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 and a right to file a petition for post-conviction relief.
Notwithstanding these rights, if the Court accepts this plea agreement
then Defendant willingly waives his right to appeal the judgment and
sentence and the right to move the Court to reconsider and reduce his
sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
(Emphasis added.)

The district court denied Mr. Fuentes’ Rule 35 motion, finding

Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion pursuant to the terms of the
plea agreement. (R., pp.118-123.) The district court found that the term of the plea
agreement regarding Mr. Fuentes’ waiver of the right to move the district court to
reconsider and reduce his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 was “a clear and
unambiguous term of contract and is enforceable under Idaho law.”

(R., p.121.)

However, an order relinquishing jurisdiction is not a “sentence” such that the term
clearly and unambiguously foreclosed the filing of a Rule 35 motion from such an order.
While a plea agreement is contractual in nature, it must be measured by contract
law standards. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013). Appellate courts exercise
free review over contract law standards. Id. A defendant may waive his right to appeal
as part of a plea agreement. Straub, 153 Idaho at 885. “The prosecuting attorney and
the attorney for the defendant . . . may engage in discussions with a view toward
reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver to the defendant’s right to appeal
the judgment and sentence of the court . . . .” I.C. R. 11(f)(1).
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A trial court has authority, under the rule governing motions to correct or reduce
sentence, to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction State v. Goodlett, 139
Idaho 262, 265 (Ct. App. 2003). Within 120 days after a court relinquishes retained
jurisdiction, a motion for reconsideration of the sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 may be
filed. Id. (in which defendant’s Rule 35 motion specifically asked the court to reconsider
the relinquishment and to place defendant on probation or to reinstate her to retained
jurisdiction program); I.C.R. 35.

“Rule 35 confers upon the trial court authority to

reconsider an order relinquishing jurisdiction and, if the court finds it appropriate, to
place the defendant on probation notwithstanding having initially ordered a sentence of
imprisonment into execution.” Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 265.
A.

The Language Of The Plea Agreement Is Clear And Unambiguous
The terms of the plea agreement entered into by the parties were clear and

unambiguous. The terms provided that Mr. Fuentes waived his right to file a Rule 35
motion asking the court to reconsider and reduce his sentence. However, the order
relinquishing jurisdiction was not a sentence such that Mr. Fuentes, in agreeing to the
terms of the plea agreement, agreed to waive his right to file a Rule 35 motion from that
order.
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the appellate court exercises
free review, and its task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012). “If the language
of the document is unambiguous, given its ordinary and well-understood meaning, we
will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the intent of the
parties.” Id.
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While the plea agreement required Mr. Fuentes to waive his “right to move the
Court to reconsider and reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,” the
relinquishment of jurisdiction is not a “sentence” and thus that term of the plea
agreement is inapplicable and does not prohibit a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration.
See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001) (holding that constitutional
protections required at sentencing are inapplicable to a retained jurisdiction because
sentencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction, not when jurisdiction is
relinquished); State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472 (1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1088 (1978)
(holding that a sentence is “imposed” when it is initially pronounced rather than when
the court later relinquishes jurisdiction); State v. Omey, 112 Idaho 930, 932 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding a sentence is “imposed” when it is initially pronounced, even though
jurisdiction is retained); but c.f. State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2012)
(holding that when jurisdiction is retained, the sentence is executed upon the transfer of
the defendant to the Board of Correction, subject to possible subsequent suspension of
the balance of the sentence).
Here, Mr. Fuentes did not file a Rule 35 motion from the initial Judgment, he filed
a Rule 35 motion from the order relinquishing jurisdiction, which was a request for the
court to reconsider putting him on probation. The language of the term of the plea
agreement provided that Mr. Fuentes waived his “right to move the Court to reconsider
and reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,” however, Mr. Fuentes did
not ask the district court to “reconsider and reduce” his sentence. He asked the district
court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and instead place him on
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probation or send him to complete another rider program—he never asked the district
court to reduce his sentence. (See PSI, pp.1-5; see generally 6/2/15 Tr.)
Further, at the time Mr. Fuentes agreed to the terms of the plea agreement, he
could not have foreseen that he would violate his probation, have it revoked but
jurisdiction retained, then would be relinquished and would thusly be prohibited from
asking the district court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Had the
parties wished to limit Mr. Fuentes’ right to file a Rule 35 motion from the order
relinquishing jurisdiction, they could have done so by specifically providing such a term
in the plea agreement. The general waiver of the right to file a Rule 35 motion from the
sentence, by its plain language, does not include this circumstance. Thus, the district
court erred in concluding that Mr. Fuentes waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion
asking the court to reconsider its order relinquishing jurisdiction as the prohibition of
such a motion was not the mutual intent of the parties when the plea was entered.
B.

Alternatively, Should This Court Find The Terms Of The Plea Agreement Were
Ambiguous, The Ambiguity Should Be Resolved In Favor Of Mr. Fuentes
Should this Court find the meaning of “right to move the Court to reconsider and

reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,” as used in the plea
agreement, is ambiguous, the Court must still find Mr. Fuentes did not waive his right to
file a Rule 35 motion from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.
“Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.”
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596 (2010). “[A]mbiguities are construed in favor of
the defendant. Focusing on the defendant’s reasonable understanding also reflects the
proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty.” Id (quoting
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United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in
original).
Should this court find the terms of the plea agreement regarding the Rule 35
waiver were ambiguous, this court must still interpret the plea agreement in favor of
Mr. Fuentes. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fuentes waived his
right to file a Rule 35 motion asking the court to reconsider its order relinquishing
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Fuentes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his
Rule 35 motion and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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